Why did Byzantine rule in Anatolia collapse in the late 13th century? The agent of change was not mighty Turkish armies which were unstoppable by the Roman army, but decentralized bands of nomadic warriors. Trebizond & Philadelphia in Anatolia survived until the 14th-15th centuries, showing locally based resistance was possible, with the right tactics, willpower, and strategic implementation.
Anthony Bryers pointed out that: “where there was the will to resist, backed by local autonomy, leadership, or identity, and coupled with the restraints of a centralized state, no Turkmens were in a position to surmount it.” In essence, where the Romans organized a local resistance which the people of Constantinople would support, the Turks were able to be defeated. Roman armies in the 13th century had been able to defeat Turkish armies, when properly led. The Empire of Nicaea was in a strong position against the Turks. During the reign of Andronikos II, some generals were able to achieve military success until the Emperor halted them out of fear of them taking the throne.
The Empire of Nicaea had been able to defend itself and expand even when surrounded by enemies. Nicaea is arguably the ideal example of the kind of government needed to deal with the Turkmen. Nicaea was near the Turkish frontier, the Emperor could react quickly. Incursions by Turkic nomads were not a far away problem, it needed to be dealt with immediately – the Turkish threat was handled successfully. Nicaea even was able to convince local elites that it could defend them and their interests. This was crucial to the success that followed.
To put together his state Theodore Laskaris, the first Roman Emperor based in Nicaea after the fall of Constantinople in 1204 to the crusaders, had to convince a couple other local strongmen to buy into his rule. Theodore Mangaphas gave up his control of Philadelphia, and the Sabbas Asidenos gave up his holdings in Anatolia in exchange for a marriage into the royal family. Laskaris thus was able to show other Romans around him that he could defend them from Turks and Latins, reward them, and that his state was worth being part of. The Seljuks also had been able to hold together large swaths of territory under relatively stable conditions as well. But that changed in the second half of the 13th century.
A POWER VACUUM AND A NEGLECTED FRONTIER:
The change of governments in Anatolia led to local bands of warriors having free reign, as Roman and Seljuk authority vanished. In the 13th century “…the most substantial Turkmen expansion in western and northwestern Anatolia followed the transfer elsewhere of two great centralized local Anatolian governments: the Seljuk state to the Mongols after 1243(definitively after 1277) and the Empire of Nicaea to Constantinople after 1261.”
Before liberating Constantinople in 1261, the Romans had focused on Anatolian security and achieved it. The Emperors based in Nicaea took great care of the border with the Seljuks. Not only did the imperial armies defeat the Seljuk army, but they had a comprehensive frontier system to deal with the local threats and smaller nomadic bands. There was a defense-in-depth strategy at play.
One of the ways they did so was to incentivize the “frontier population, the akritai.” These local warriors were key to maintaining a “successful equilibrium.” The “akritai were local warriors exempt from paying taxes to the emperor, who augmented their lands and flocks through forays across the border. Their wealth grew apace with their fighting spirit, but their heavy taxation after 1261 is alleged to have demotivated them to serve as guardians of the border. The neighbors of the akritai, the nomadic Turkmen, had a similar lifestyle and dislike for central authority.” By having a similar lifestyle as the nomadic Turks, it meant they were uniquely able to fight the kind of border skirmishes needed to combat unorganized bands of mounted Turkish raiders. Losing these skirmishes could mean losing control between cities and fortresses which meant they could be besieged gradually, one by one. Michael VIII Palaiologos may have entered Constantinople triumphantly, but these humble warriors were extremely important. Taxing them harshly to help rebuild the freshly liberated capital was a mistake. They needed these men more than ever… (source for this paragraph: The Byzantine Hellene: The Life of Emperor Theodore Laskaris and Byzantium in the Thirteenth Century by Dimiter Angelov )
EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE AFTER 1261:
One very peculiar example of a stubborn local resistance is the fact that Philadelphia survived until 1390. This wasn’t a grand city like Nicaea either. Turkish power was very divided and it shows that a competent local power was capable of holding land, and making deals to survive. It illustrates that had the Roman state been more competent and focused on Anatolia there’s a real chance it could have held more territory far longer.
The Empire of Trebizond was able to hold out even longer than Constantinople did, falling in 1461, several years after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Trebizond did have geography on its side, being mountainous and more defendable. However it’s not like every mountain area was able to retain independence. Geography alone does not explain the success of Trebizond in surviving. They clear were able to get the population to engage in the defense of the polity in an effective manner.
THE EVAPORATION OF BYZANTINE AUTHORITY:
Anthony Bryers noted in his article that “the coefficient between the decline of centralized government and the spread of pastoralism is familiar enough, but what is striking is not the evaporation of Byzantine authority in western Anatolia……and its subsequent supplanting by seven emirates of more or less Turkmen origin, within half a century of the loss of its local government in 1261, but the survival (until 1390) of the one enclave there which had local autonomy and wished to keep it: Philadelphia(Alasehir).”
Local powers could cater to the interest of the local people, and keep them invested in the state enough to resist incursions. Keeping the elites happy and eager to be involved in the affairs of the state was crucial in defending any territory. In contrast to Theodore Laskaris, whom convinced the elites of western Anatolia that his rule was the best path forward, Michael VIII Palailogos changed the sentiment and alienated the locals. Instead of empowering the locals, he taxed them more heavily and prioritized the defenses less.
The contemporary George Pachymeres wrote that: “The Emperor had exhausted the treasury and bankrupted the Empire……and he has imposed crushing taxation on the people of these areas to make up the deficiencies…the farmers of paphlagonia and further afield, unable to find the tax in currency, which they were required to do, gave up the hopeless task and went over to the Turks day by day……regarding them as better masters than the Emperor. The trickle of defectors became a flood, and the Turks employed them as guides and allies to lead them the other way and to ravage the land of those who remained loyal to the Emperor, at first by way of raiding parties,……but soon as permanent settlers taking over the land. The Emperor meanwhile turned a deaf ear to all appeals for help, and spent all his energies on the west, disregarding what was at his own feet(Anatolia).”
Pachymeres text is really a great illustration of how the shifted focus of the state from Anatolia to Europe directly led locals to feeling their prosperity no longer was tied to the state. Repairing Constantinople didn’t benefit Anatolians, it hurt them militarily/financially. For a farmer or town-dweller on the frontier, why fight to pay crippling taxes while receiving subpar military protection? Elites would either switch sides or relocate to safer areas. The lost territory was then demographically changed by Turkic settlers. It was a vicious cycle, and this is how by 1300 the situation was becoming irreversible.
Source:
shadowsofconstantinople.com 