This was a pivotal era in the medieval Roman history. In my estimation Manuel Komnenos (ruled 1143-1180) had the resources, the power, the prestige, and even the personal talent to achieve a definitive victory over the Seljuks. His grandfather Alexios Komnenos and his father John II Komnenos left him a restored empire with great wealth, which he loved to spend. He was capable enough to defeat the Turks, and in fact did so. The failure was that, instead of following up on victories, he allowed divided Turkish opposition in Anatolia to become united under his “ally” Kilij Arslan.
Nominal submission did not truly help the geopolitical situation of the Roman Empire. This complacency along with poor leadership during the campaign itself led in him being defeated at Myriokephalon in 1176, and eventually contributed to territorial losses after his reign ended in 1180.
John II Komnenos had carefully maintained a divide and conquer policy over the Turks, he led armies to achieve his goals as often as he needed to. Catastrophically, this balance was lost after the treaties between the Romans and Turks under Manuel. “After Kilij Arslan II’s accession in 1156 there were no fewer than 5 Turkish states in central Anatolia: The sultanate of Rum itself, the Danishmend emirates of Sebasteia, Caesarea, and Melitene, and the Paphlagonian appanage of Shahinshah.” It was common sense Roman foreign policy goal to keep them divided.
At times in his reign, Manuel showed he could be his father’s son. He could lead the Roman army to victory in Anatolia. “Manuel’s campaign against Antioch in 1158-9 was a vivid demonstration of residual Byzantine power: he defeated both Kilij Arsan and Thoros II (of Cilician Armenia) en route to Cilicia – which reverted to being a Byzantine province – before forcing Reynald (of the Principality of Antioch) to become his vassal.” This was a great achievement, to be fair.
Kilij Arslan was “defeated in 1160 by the armies of both John Kontostephanos (a Roman general) and Yaghibisan.” The game was up for Kilij Arslan, he had tried everything to defeat Manuel. But now had to submit – he “swore to be the empire’s military ally” and also “swore that he would become Manuel’s friend (philos), retainer, and son.” Essentially, the Seljuks were in theory a vassal of Manuel. Finally, towards the end of 1161 “Kilij Arslan travelled to Constantinople, where the Sultan signed a peace treaty.” The Sultan was even received in a Turkish style palace hall in the Great Palace, part of the renovation program of Manuel.
One could argue this was a big triumph. And, I think it was. However, this tale is not over. The Sultan never really gave up on his plan, it just became a longer-term plan to defeat the Romans. The victory of Manuel over the Seljuks should have been phase 1 for the Emperor’s grand plan to liberate central Anatolia, not the final goal. I understand Manuel wanted to use the peace to deal with other issues, and in fact that is very reasonable to do so. It the fact the he did not circle back to the Seljuks quicker which would have terrible consequences. The fact is that “this stability in Anatolia lasted for only 15 years.”
It’s shocking that Kilij Arslan used this peace far better than Manuel, who had the advantage of victory. When Yaghibisan of the Danishmends died, there was opportunity for Seljuk expansion. The Sultan worked to unify the other Turkic states under his banner while Manuel remained happy with his “submission.” This was no submission at all though, as events would show. Kilij Arslan said the right things, in theory negotiating a deal with Manuel to divide Danishmend lands – but the Romans would never get Sebasteia as promised. What kind of submission leads to the one submitting dictating terms. The Sultan had called Manuel’s bluff – “Manuel did not respond to the sultan’s actions….Manuel allowed his ally Kilij Arslan to enlarge the sultanate…” This is where Manuel Komnenos, for me, went from a very good emperor to something less than that. Alexios or John would have dealt with this far better.
Thus, Manuel had allowed a peace which he had admirably won through military victory to be a window for Arslan to absorb his Turkish rivals, to emerge as a rival to the Romans once more. Arslan even formed alliances with others against Byzantine interests. “Although the Sultan did not quite dare proclaim open war against Byzantium, the Byzantine-Seljuq alliance was almost dead.” Eventually he “occupied Sebasteia” – the city Manuel was supposed to receive.
“Only then did Manuel realize the scale of the danger. Instead of being able to exploit the divisions among the Turkish states, he now faced a sultanate that had united almost all the Turks in Asia Minor beneath its banner.” He had gone from a victory furthering his father’s work, to letting divide and conquer policy in Anatolia disintegrate completely. The Emperor acted in face of these bubble-bursting reality, first sending two smaller expeditions in 1175 to try to claim some Danishmend lands – but with no success.
Something major had to be done, diplomacy could not fill the hole that Manuel’s failure had created. The only hope was the one tool he still had, Roman military might. And this tool could have reversed the situation, and arguably should have. Manuel mustered a mighty army to march to Iconium (Konya), the Seljuk capital. “But the situation had changed, the sultan now possessed far greater military resources (than before, not greater than Manuel) and he summoned all his troops, including those from the newly conquered lands. On 17 September 1176, the Seljuks trapped the Byzantine army” and they were defeated at the battle of Myriokephalon.
This is another major failure of Manuel. The Roman army was superior to the Seljuks, who did not even attempt to face the Roman army in open battle. Manuel walked his army into the type of ambush that an Emperor like Alexios or John simply would not have allowed for. Manuel failed to implement basic military strategies to avoid an ambush. But it does not matter, the Romans never had a 50-50 chance at destroying the Seljuks again, let along the favorable odds that Manuel had. He was happy in Constantinople in his immaculate new palaces, impressing foreign visitors and court officials. He was content with a nominal submission and allowed the Turks he defeated to grow their power and undermine him. I do not rate Manuel as highly as I do John and Alexios, he had the most power of the 3 but achieved the least. He is half a great emperor and half a terrible one.
The Komnenian restoration thus peaked in his reign, only to roll back down the mountain after his death. The Roman army remained capable after Myriokephalon, but the momentum was lost. I truly believe Manuel had great ability and that he could have been one of the greatest ever Emperors. His character is a fascinating mix of talent, ability, splendor, opulence, wastefulness, success, failure, and most of all inability to focus. Whatever one makes of him, his reign is fascinating to read about though.
Source:
The Cambridge History of Byzantium
shadowsofconstantinople.com 